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Article 39 EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 
 
Lamin Khadar and Jo Shaw, University of Edinburgh 
 
Article 39 
 
Right to vote and to stand as a candidate at elections to the European Parliament 
 
1. Every citizen of the Union has the right to vote and to stand as a candidate at elections to the 
European Parliament in the Member State in which he or she resides, under the same conditions 
as nationals of that State. 
 
2. Members of the European Parliament shall be elected by direct universal suffrage in a free and 
secret ballot. 
 
Explanation on Article 39 — Right to vote and to stand as a candidate at elections to the European 
Parliament 
 
Article 39 applies under the conditions laid down in the Treaties, in accordance with Article 52(2) of 
the Charter. Article 39(1) corresponds to the right guaranteed in Article 20(2) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (cf. also the legal base in Article 22 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union for the adoption of detailed arrangements for the exercise of that 
right) and Article 39(2) corresponds to Article 14(3) of the Treaty on European Union. Article 39(2) 
takes over the basic principles of the electoral system in a democratic State. 
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A. Field of Application of Article 39  
 
Article 39 applies to the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union and, more 
significantly in this context, to the Member States, in fulfilling their pre-existing obligations under 
Union law with respect to the guaranteeing of European parliamentary electoral rights.1  
 
Specifically, Article 39 applies to Member States in their implementation of the Direct Elections Act 
1976.2 Once agreed to by the Member States, the Direct Elections Act could only take effect once 
implemented at the national level. The Act provides for free, secret, direct and universal elections to 
the European Parliament. In absence of a uniform electoral procedure, which has not thus far been 
agreed upon,3 Member States may apply their own electoral procedure to enfranchise citizens of the 
Union in European Parliament elections within the fairly loose confines set out in the Direct 
Elections Act.4  
 
Article 39 also applies to Member States with respect to their transposition of Council Directive 
93/109/EC,5 which lays down detailed arrangements for, inter alia, the exercise of the right to vote 
and stand as a candidate in elections to the European Parliament for citizens of the Union residing in 
a Member State of which they are not nationals. 
 
B. Interrelationship of Article 39 with other provisions of the Charter  
 
Article 39 of the Charter does not refer explicitly to any other provisions of the Charter. However, it 
is closely related to Article 40 (on the right to vote and to stand as a candidate at municipal elections) 
                                                 
1 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Articles 51 and 52 generally, (2012/C 326/02). 
2 The Council Decision and Act concerning the election of the representatives of the European Parliament by direct 
universal suffrage, OJ 1976 C27/5. 
3 Although there has been no agreement on a uniform electoral procedure, there has been a steady convergence of 
electoral systems in the period since the first direct elections of the European parliament in 1979: for example, the 
universal adoption of proportional representation and abolition of the dual mandate of Members of the European 
Parliament to the European Parliament and their respective national Parliaments in 2002 and the formal establishment of 
political parties at EU level in 2003/4.. 
4 The Direct Elections Act stipulates, inter alia, that: elections are to be by direct universal suffrage and should be free 
and secret; members of the European Parliament are to be elected on the basis of proportional representation, using the 
list system or the single transferable vote; in accordance with its specific national situation, each Member State may 
establish constituencies for elections to the European Parliament or subdivide its electoral area in a different manner, 
without generally affecting the proportional nature of the voting system; Member States may set a minimum threshold 
for the allocation of seats; and each Member State may set a ceiling for candidates' campaign expenses. 
5 Directive 93/109/EC, OJ [1993] L 329/34. See also Directive 2013/1/EU, OJ [2013] L 26/27discussed at n.55 below. 
 3 
within the broad scheme of Union citizenship, and is also connected with Article 12(2), which 
governs the role of political parties in the European Union. Furthermore, Article 39 is also indirectly 
interrelated with some of the more general provisions of the Charter to the extent that it comes within 
their field of application.  
 
The right to vote and to stand as a candidate at municipal elections 
As will be discussed in more detail below, although the first direct European Parliament elections 
were held in 1979, Union citizens did not have any explicitly articulated and justiciable electoral 
rights, in the Treaties or elsewhere in EU law, until the 1992 Maastricht Treaty. When a limited 
range of EU electoral rights were finally instituted in 1993 along with the status of ‘Union 
citizenship’, this represented for the EU institutions, especially the Commission and the European 
Parliament, the culmination of a longstanding debate.6 What is interesting is that the right to equal 
treatment for non-national Union citizens voting and standing as candidates in European Parliament 
elections (now Articles 20(2)(b) and 22(2) TFEU) was introduced together with, and under the same 
provision as, a right to equal treatment for non-national Union citizens voting in municipal elections 
(now Articles 20(2)(b) and 22(1) TFEU). The explanation for this arrangement can be discerned by 
reference to what can be described as the ‘twin roots’ of the Maastricht Treaty electoral rights 
framework.7 These have been described by D’Oliveira as “the emergence of a Community or Union 
collectivity” in tandem with the extension of the “principles of democracy” within the institutions of 
the Union.8 On this view, the Maastricht Treaty electoral rights framework emerged out of the 
twining, by the Parliament, of two issues i.e. on the one hand, the development of free movement 
rights under the Treaty and the desire promote the political integration of EU citizens who had taken 
advantage of their free movement rights and, on the other hand, the struggle towards greater formal 
democratization of the institutions of European integration through increased popular participation.  
 
From this perspective, Article 39 and Article 40 of the Charter are historically connected within the 
schemes of European integration and institutional democratization as articulated through the concept 
of Union citizenship and its associated rights in the Treaties. 
 
Political parties of the Union 
 
The idea of political parties at Union level has been invested with the most meaning in the context of 
the European Parliament, and, consequently, Article 12(2) CFR and Article 39 CFR are intimately 
related. 
 
General Charter provisions with which Article 39 is indirectly related 
 
Article 39 CFR is also interrelated with the general provisions of the Charter, at Articles 51 to 53, to 
the extent that its application must be in accordance with such provisions.9  
 
 
C. Sources of Article 39 Rights  
 
                                                 
6 J Shaw, ‘Sovereignty at the Boundaries of the Polity’, in Sovereignty in Transition, N Walker, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 
2003, at pp461-500. 
7 Ibid. 
8 HUJ d’Oliveira, ‘European Citizenship: Its Meaning, Its Potential’, in R Dehousse (ed.), Europe after Maastricht: An 
Ever Closer Union?, Law Books in Europe, Munich, 1994, at pp142-143. See also J Shaw and S Day, ‘European Union 
electoral rights and the political participation of migrants in host polities’, (2002) 8, International Journal of Population 
Geography, 183–199. 
9 By way of example, in Case C-145/04 Spain v UK, [2006] ECR I-07917, both the UK and the European Commission 
relied on Article 53 CFR to justify the UK extension of European parliamentary voting rights beyond EU citizens to 
include also so-called ‘Qualifying Commonwealth Citizens’. 
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I. ECHR 
 
Article 3, Protocol 110 of the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”) (1950), provides 
that: 
 
The High Contracting Parties undertake to hold free elections at reasonable intervals by secret ballot, 
under conditions which will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of 
the legislature. 
 
Article 3 was initially understood as merely recognising the principle of universal suffrage and 
creating an obligation on States to hold free elections (rather than conferring any substantive 
rights).11 However, in later years, the position changed and the European Commission of Human 
Rights (“EComHR”) began to interpret Article 3 as implying, within the framework of universal 
suffrage, “certain individual rights, such as the right to vote and the right to stand for election”.12 
However, there was never any illusion that such rights were absolute. Some of the early 
jurisprudence on this point is instructive: in the 1974 case, X v the Netherlands,13 the EComHR noted 
that:  
 
[although] the Commission […] has ruled that the undertaking of the Contracting Parties to hold free 
elections implies the recognition of universal suffrage […] it does not follow that Article 3 accords 
the right unreservedly to every single individual to take part in elections. It is indeed generally 
recognised that certain limited groups of individuals may be disqualified from voting, provided that 
this disqualification is not arbitrary. 
 
[Emphasis added] 
 
This caveat to the right to universal suffrage was echoed by the European Court of Human Rights 
(the “ECrtHR”) in Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v Belgium,14 where the ECrtHR made plain that: 
 
[t]he rights in question are not absolute. Since Article 3 recognises them without setting them forth in 
express terms, let alone defining them, there is room for implied limitations […] In their internal legal 
orders the Contracting States make the rights to vote and to stand for election subject to conditions 
which are not in principle precluded under Article 3 […] They have a wide margin of appreciation in 
this sphere. 
 
[Emphasis added] 
 
The debate over just how wide this ‘margin of appreciation’ actually is, in practice, has continued to 
the current day and will be discussed in more detail below.  
 
II. UN Treaties  
 
While the UN treaties will, in practice, have little bearing on the interpretation of Article 39 CFR, a 
lot can be learned about the genesis and historical scope of the principle of universal suffrage, as 
articulated at Article 39(2), by looking at these treaties. Moreover, the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) and the International Convention on the Elimination of All 
                                                 
10 Protocol 1 was signed in Paris on 20 March 1952. 
11 DJ Harris, E Bates, M O'Boyle, C Warbrick and C Buckley, Law of the European Convention on Human Rights, 
OUP, Oxford, 2009, p712, n.10. 
12 Alliance des Belges v Belgium, N° 8612/7 9 (1979), reference to Applications N° 6745/76 and 6746/76 v Belgium 
(1976). 
13X v the Netherlands N° 6573/74 (1974). 
14 Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v Belgium, N° 9267/81 (1981), at paragraph 52. 
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Forms of Racial Discrimination (“ICERD”) are occasionally referred to in ECrtHR judgments as 
relevant law for interpretive purposes.15  
 
Article 21 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”) (1948) provides that:  
 
1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely 
chosen representatives. 
2) Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in his country. 
3) The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be 
expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage 
and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures. 
 
Article 25 ICCPR (1966), provides that: 
 
Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity […] without unreasonable restrictions:  
a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives;  
b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal 
suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the 
electors;  
c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his country.  
 
It can be seen from the above that the UN treaties allocate political membership on the basis of 
nationality i.e. recognising political rights as citizens’ rights rather than human rights. The ICCPR 
goes so far as to explicitly restrict political rights to ‘citizens’, while the UDHR grants everyone the 
right to take part in the “government of his country” (perhaps implicitly excluding non-citizens).16 
However, it should be pointed out that, in a footnote to a 2006 report on the rights of non-citizens, 
the UN Office of the Commissioner for Human Rights, responsible for monitoring the 
implementation of the ICCPR, did go so far as to assert that: 
 
States should consider granting the right to participate in public life at the local level, including the 
right to vote in local elections, to long-term non-citizen residents.17 
 
Meanwhile, Article 5(c) ICERD (1965) provides that: 
 
[…] States Parties undertake to prohibit and to eliminate racial discrimination in all its forms and to 
guarantee the right of everyone, without distinction as to race, colour, or national or ethnic origin, to 
equality before the law, notably in the enjoyment of the following rights:  
 
(c) Political rights, in particular the right to participate in elections-to vote and to stand for 
election-on the basis of universal and equal suffrage, to take part in the Government as well as in 
the conduct of public affairs at any level and to have equal access to public service […] 
 
The ICERD is notable as an exception in terms of the language used, firstly in so far as it is 
structured around State obligations and not rights and secondly, in that, prima facie, it appears to 
leave some normative space for the inclusion of non-citizens within the scope of the proffered 
undertakings. However, in a 2004 report, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 
responsible for monitoring the implementation of the Convention, noted that: 
 
                                                 
15  See e.g. Sitaropoulos and Others v Greece (No 2), N° 42202/07, (2012) and Sejdić and Finci v Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, N° 27996/06 and 34836/06 (2009). 
16 R Rubio-Marin, ‘Transnational Politics and the Democratic Nation-State: Normative Challenges of Expatriate Voting 
and Nationality Retention of Emigrants’, (2006) 81 New York University Law Review 190 at 199, n.4. 
17 UN Office of the Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘The Rights of Non-Citizens’, 2006, n.8. 
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[S]ome of these rights [in the Convention], such as the right to participate in elections, to vote and to 
stand for election, may be confined to citizens […]18 
 
It appears that for the time-being at least, it is entirely legitimate under the UN Treaties for States to 
exclude non-citizens from the protective umbrella of the principle of universal suffrage. 
 
In addition, Article 29, the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities provides that:  
 
States Parties shall guarantee to persons with disabilities political rights and the opportunity to enjoy 
them on an equal basis with others […] 
 
The non-discriminatory application of universal suffrage rights in the context of disability is gaining 
increasing currency as an issue in the EU and will be discussed in more detail below.  
 
III. Council of Europe Treaties  
 
Article 6 of the Convention on the Participation of Foreigners in Public Life at Local Level (1992) 
provides for the right to vote for resident non-citizens at the local level. However, the provision is 
only currently in force in 6 Contracting States: the Netherlands, Norway, Iceland, Denmark, Sweden 
and Finland. It offers, however, some of the backdrop against which votes for non-citizens have 
become an increasing issue in the EU and its Member States. 
 
 
IV. Other Sources: the EU Treaties 
 
Without a doubt, the most important background sources of Article 39 CFR are the EU Treaties 
themselves. This is especially so given that, as mentioned earlier, the CFR only applies within the 
scope of Union law and does not prima facie extend or modify any rights already guaranteed under 
the Treaties.  
 
The provisions set out below will be dealt with in more detail in the following sections of this 
chapter and, for present purposes, it will be sufficient to note that, of all the law analysed so far in 
this Section, the EU Treaties are notable in that they explicitly provide for the safeguarding of 
electoral rights for specific categories of non-citizen residents in all EU Member States.  
 
The relevant provisions are as follows: 
 
Article 20(2)(b) TFEU provides: 
 
Citizens of the Union shall enjoy the rights and be subject to the duties provided for in the Treaties. They 
shall have, inter alia: 
 
(b) the right to vote and to stand as candidates in elections to the European Parliament and in 
municipal elections in their Member State of residence, under the same conditions as nationals of that 
State; 
 
Article 22(2) TFEU provides: 
 
[E]very citizen of the Union residing in a Member State of which he is not a national shall have the right 
to vote and to stand as a candidate in elections to the European Parliament in the Member State in which 
he resides, under the same conditions as nationals of that State. This right shall be exercised subject to 
                                                 
18 Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, ‘General recommendation on discrimination against non-
citizens’, 2004, at Article 3. 
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detailed arrangements adopted by the Council, acting unanimously in accordance with a special legislative 
procedure and after consulting the European Parliament; these arrangements may provide for derogations 
where warranted by problems specific to a Member State. 
 
Article 10 TEU provides: 
 
1. The functioning of the Union shall be founded on representative democracy. 
2. Citizens are directly represented at Union level in the European Parliament. 
[…] 
3. Every citizen shall have the right to participate in the democratic life of the Union. Decisions shall 
be taken as openly and as closely as possible to the citizen. 
4. Political parties at European level contribute to forming European political awareness and to 
expressing the will of citizens of the Union. 
 
[Emphasis added] 
 
Article 14(3) TEU provides: 
 
The members of the European Parliament shall be elected for a term of five years by direct universal 
suffrage in a free and secret ballot. 
 
A quick comparison between these EU Treaty provisions and Article 39 CFR reveals that Article 
39(1) CFR loosely corresponds to Articles 20(2)(b) and 22(2) TFEU, whereas Article 39(2) CFR 
loosely corresponds to Articles 10(3) and 14(3) TEU. The former set of provisions can be described 
as ‘EU citizen equal treatment rights’, whereas as the latter could be broadly described as ‘universal 
suffrage rights’.  
 
 
D. Analysis  
 
I. General Remarks  
 
It is worth setting out, in some detail, the history and evolution of European parliamentary electoral 
rights because it is these pre-existing rights that will give substance to Article 39 CFR.  
 
In the long history of European integration, there can be a discerned a laboured yet persistent drive 
towards the effective political representation of European citizens. The ideal of a European 
Parliament which would be directly elected by universal suffrage can be traced back to the birth of 
the European Parliament itself (or rather, the "Common Assembly"19 of the European Coal and Steel 
Community (the “ECSC”), as it was then known). This fact is recorded in Article 21(1) of the 1951 
Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (the “Treaty of Paris”) which provides 
that: 
 
The Assembly shall consist of delegates whom the Parliaments of each of the member states shall be 
called upon to appoint once a year from their own membership, or who shall be elected by direct 
universal suffrage, according to the procedure determined by each respective High Contracting Party.  
 
[Emphasis added] 
 
In its initial iteration then, the ideal of direct elections to the Assembly by universal suffrage is 
framed as an option20 (which was never exercised by the Member States). Just six years later, by 
                                                 
19 The title was changed from ‘Assembly’ to ‘Parliament’ by Resolution of the Assembly of 30 March 1962, 1045. 
20 This option was introduced on a proposal from the Foreign Affairs Committee of the French National Assembly, see P 
Reuter, La Communauté européenne du charbon et de l’acier, Paris, 1953, p59. 
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virtue of Article 2(2) of the 1957 Convention on Certain Institutions Common to the European 
Communities, Article 21 of the Treaty of Paris was amended and the following provision was 
introduced as Article 21(3): 
 
The Assembly shall draw up proposals for elections by direct universal suffrage in accordance with a 
uniform procedure in all Member States. 
 
The Council shall, acting unanimously, lay down the appropriate provisions, which it shall 
recommend to Member States for adoption in accordance with their respective constitutional 
requirements. 
 
In its second iteration, the ideal of direct elections to the Assembly by universal suffrage is framed, 
in less ambitious terms, as a goal to be achieved by the Assembly and the Council working jointly at 
some unspecified future point in time.21 Subsequent to this, Article 21(3) of the Treaty of Paris was 
reiterated in Article 138(3) of the 1958 Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (the 
“Treaty of Rome”) and so, in any event, it is evident that almost from the very beginning, the 
architects of the European Communities had envisaged the creation of a Parliament that would be 
directly elected by universal suffrage. It is also interesting to note that a ‘uniform procedure’ for 
elections was envisioned – something that would prove very difficult to achieve. Furthermore, as just 
indicated, neither the Treaty of Paris nor the Treaty of Rome provided any timetable for achieving 
elections of the Parliament by direct universal suffrage and ultimately, in spite of these clearly 
articulated early intentions, it would take almost thirty years to actually achieve this goal.  
 
Throughout the 1960s, the Parliament framed the debate around the effective political representation 
of European citizens in terms of ‘building Europe’22 and establishing democracy to support this 
aim.23 This debate was likely energised by the perceived lack of legitimacy of the Parliament and 
with respect to the decision making process within the Community institutions more generally.24 
Indeed, for the first few decades of its life, the Assembly (and subsequently the Parliament) was 
populated by parliamentarians appointed by the executives of their respective Member States. This 
arrangement also reveals one of the major early obstacles to the introduction of direct elections i.e. 
that there seems to have been a significant fear that ‘anti-European’ parties (such as the French and 
Italian Communist parties), if permitted to be elected to the Assembly, would obstruct the 
development of the Community.25 Another obstacle seems to have been that the Parliament remained 
relatively powerless, in legislative terms, until the 1970s and so it was argued that, in view of its 
limited powers, direct elections were not warranted.26 The overarching problem can possibly be 
boiled down to a lack of political will on the part of the executives of the Member States; in the early 
days of the European Communities, priority was given to economic integration over political 
integration and so the Parliament, while receiving a limited degree of support, 27  encountered 
significant opposition. For example, although the Assembly had adopted a proposal for a uniform 
                                                 
21 This provision results from a proposal made by the Italian delegation to the Intergovernmental Conference that drafted 
the Rome Treaties, See F Piodo, Towards direct elections to the European Parliament, European Communities, 2009, 
p15. 
22 Ninth General Report on the Activities of the Community, 1 February 1960 to 31 January 1961. 
23 ‘The European Parliament demands that the application of the principles of constitutional theory based on democracy 
and the primacy of law should be reinforced in order to endure the future development of the Community.’ 4 Bulletin de 
la Communauté Européene du Charbon et de l’Acier, Chronologie Années 1950-1960, Luxembourg, 1967,p68.  
24 Y Mény (ed.), Building Parliament:50 years of European Parliament History, Office for Official Publications of the 
European Communities, Luxembourg, 2009, p35. 
25 Ibid. p9. 
26 J Shaw, The Transformation of Citizenship in the European Union: Electoral Rights and the Restructuring of Political 
Space, Cambridge, 2007, p103. 
27 The Italian Government had introduced measures concerning the direct elections of Italian members of the European 
Parliament, and in 1968 Christian Democrat MEPs asked the Italian Government to invite other European governments 
to begin the direct election of their members; see Cahiers de documentation européenne, October-Décembre 1969, 
Parliament Européen, 69. 
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electoral procedure for direct elections to the European Parliament as early as 1960,28 it received a 
lukewarm response from the foreign ministers of the Member States and very little action was 
actually taken with respect to this proposal throughout the 60s.29  
 
The status quo changed in the 1970s when – partially as a result of the election in March 1974 of 
Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, a supporter of direct elections, as French President – the attitude of the 
Member States’ executives became more conducive to the idea of direct elections to the 
Parliament.30 The final communiqué of the Summit of Heads of State or Government in Paris of 
December 1974 maintained that direct elections to the European Parliament should take place “as 
soon as possible”.31 The communiqué even went so far as to direct the Council of Ministers to reach 
a decision by the end of 1976.32 To that end, the decision to hold direct elections was taken in Rome 
in December 1975 by the European Council and, on 20 September 1976, the Council Act on Direct 
Elections was adopted. Finally, after almost 30 years of effort, the first European parliamentary 
elections were held in 1979. Although, as already noted, 33 the 1976 Act lays down some limited 
‘uniform’ aspects of elections to the European Parliament,34 ultimately, the Member States are left 
with very wide discretion in terms of implementation. Indeed, the ‘uniform procedure’ for European 
Parliament elections, promised as early as 1957 in the Treaty of Paris, was still no nearer to being 
realised. 
 
It is important to remember that, at this early stage in its development, the nascent ‘right’ to vote35 in 
European parliamentary elections was only secured at the national level, to the citizens of the 
Member States resident in those states. The adoption of the 1976 Act had no impact, as such, on the 
rights of European citizens at the level of EU law. Rather, it merely recommended the Member 
States should implement provisions at the national level allowing for free, secret, direct and universal 
elections to the European Parliament.36 In this light, soon after the first direct elections in 1979, the 
Parliament settled down to examine the criteria for extending the right to vote as an entitlement 
under EU law. However, the period of ‘Eurosclerosis’37 (i.e. the period of political stalemate, in 
terms of European integration, and economic stagnation) throughout the early 1980s largely side-
lined the voting rights debate for a number of years.  
 
It was not until the mid-80s, when Jacques Delors took over from Gaston Thorn as President of the 
Commission, that the debate truly gained some momentum once again. Delors quickly introduced a 
timetable for the completion of the internal market before 1992.38 This initiative proved to be a 
catalyst for Treaty reform and led, via the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht, to the first concrete legal 
development, at the EU law level, in relation to the European parliamentary voting and, candidacy 
rights, of European citizens. The Treaty of Maastricht and the formal creation of ‘citizenship of the 
Union’ (now to be found in Article 20 TFEU) saw the introduction of limited equal treatment rights 
                                                 
28 The proposal is to be found in a Resolution dated 17 May 1960, Journal Officiel 1960, 834, Article 7. 
29 A communiqué from the six Foreign Ministers announced that five Member States were willing to take it under 
consideration, but France did not consider it the right time, see above n.21, Towards direct elections to the European 
Parliament, p25. 
30 Above at n. 24, Y Mény (ed.), Building Parliament:50 years of European Parliament History, p36. See also S Pinder, 
‘Steps Towards a Federal European Parliament’, (2000) 35 International Spectator: Italian Journal of International 
Affairs, p15. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid. 
33 See above at n.4 
34 Most of the limited aspects of uniform procedure contained in the 1976 Act were introduced by amendment in 
2002.See more on this below in the discussion of Council Decision 2002/772/EC. 
35 N.B. the Direct Elections Act made no reference to a right to stand as a candidate. 
36 The Council Decision and Act concerning the election of the representatives of the European Parliament by direct 
universal suffrage, OJ 1976 C27/5. 
37 Coined by Herbert Giersch at a Lecture delivered in Sydney on August 20, 1985, at the Regional Meeting of the Mont 
Pelerin Society. 
38 Commission White Paper on completing the Internal Market (COM(85) 310). 
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for nationals of the Member States in local and European parliamentary elections (now to be found in 
Articles 20(2)(b) and 22 TFEU).  
 
It warrants mentioning that the creation of ‘citizenship of the Union’ did not affect, in any way, the 
quality of national citizenship or the competence of Member States to determine their citizenry. 
Union citizenship only had a constitutional impact upon the Member States within the confines of 
the principle of ‘additionality’ as now set out in Article 9 TEU39 and Article 20(1) TFEU40. 
 
It should also be recalled that while there was now, thanks to the Maastricht Treaty, a right of equal 
treatment (in the context of voting in European parliamentary elections) for Union citizens exercising 
their free movement rights, there was still no universal right to vote at the level of EU law. That is to 
say, there was still no explicit EU law right to vote in European Parliament elections which would 
embrace all Union citizens i.e. including those who remained ‘static’. This would not formally come 
to pass until the Treaty of Lisbon, 14 years later, although jurisprudence from the ECrtHR implicitly 
established the universality of the right to vote in European Parliament elections as early as 1999.41  
 
The original EP electoral rights provision (Article 8(b) of the Treaty Establishing the European 
Community (the “TEC”, now the TFEU)) was implemented in 1993 through Directive 93/109/EC,42 
which specifically addresses the issue of the equal treatment rights of ‘mobile’ EU citizens who have 
exercised their free movement rights to move from their Member State of nationality to a second 
Member State. Directive 93/109/EC is structured around the concept of the ‘Community voter’, i.e. 
the national of one Member State (and consequently a citizen of the Union) who is resident in 
another Member State and who therefore has the right to vote in European Parliament elections by 
virtue of the Directive.43 In summary, the Directive essentially sets out the requirements to be met by 
such mobile EU citizens wishing to vote or stand as a candidate in their country of residence.44 
Additionally, the Directive sets out some minimal procedural requirements and permissions, in terms 
of information exchange between Member States and the exercise of voting rights, and a further 
provision in relation to derogations.45 The 1998 Commission report on the implementation of the 
Directive indicated that the Directive had been applied by all EU Member States to the elections to 
the European Parliament of June 1994.46 Indeed, while implementation has been, broadly speaking, 
without upset, 47 contention has arisen primarily as regards the circumstances in which national 
electoral law can curtail the Treaty rights which the Directive implements (see further on this at 
Sections DIII and DIV below).48  
                                                 
39 I.e., ‘Citizenship of the Union shall be additional to and not replace national citizenship.’ 
40 I.e., ‘Citizenship of the Union is hereby established. Every person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a 
citizen of the Union. Citizenship of the Union shall be additional to and not replace national citizenship.’ 
41 See Matthews v United Kingdom, N° 24833/94, (1999) – discussed in more detail below. 
42 Directive 93/109/EC, OJ [1993] L 329/34. Art. 22(1) was implemented through Directive 94/80/EC, OJ [1994] L 
368/38. 
43 Above at n. 26, J. Shaw, The Transformation of Citizenship in the European Union, p132. 
44 See Directive 93/109/EC, Articles 3 to 6. 
45 Ibid. Articles 7 to 13 and Article 14 respectively. 
46 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the application of Directive 93/109/EC - 
Voting rights of EU citizens living in a Member State of which they are not nationals in European Parliament elections 
(COM(97)731). 
47 There was some disappointment on the part of the Commission in relation to information exchange between the 
Member States. See, Communication from the Commission of 18 December 2000 on the application of Directive 
93/109/EC to the June 1999 elections to the European Parliament – Right of Union citizens residing in a Member State of 
which they are not nationals to vote and stand in elections to the European Parliament (COM (2000) 843). 
48 See also, Report from the Commission of 27 October on the election of Members of the European Parliament and on 
the participation of European Union citizens in the elections for the European Parliament in the Member State of 
residence (COM (2010) 605) which notes that, ‘while in general, EU countries have correctly transposed and 
implemented Directive 93/109/EC, a few countries impose conditions on non-national EU citizens, thereby creating 
obstacles to the exercise of their right to vote and to stand as a candidate in their countries of residence; in certain cases 
contrary to the directive. Furthermore, a number of EU countries must also take further measures to ensure that they 
comply with the obligation to provide sufficient information to citizens on the exercising of their rights.’ 
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Directive 93/109 does not affect the rights of the nationals of a Member State to vote and stand in 
European Parliament elections in their own country, whatever their circumstances. In other words, it 
does not regulate the question of whether Member States must allow external voting in European 
Parliament elections. It should also be noted that the Directive allows considerable scope for national 
variation in implementation measures and, consequently, left unattained the promise of a ‘uniform 
procedure’ for European parliamentary elections which, as already noted, was made as long ago as 
1957. However, by virtue of the case-law of the CJEU, which will be discussed in further detail 
below, while Member States do enjoy substantial discretion in determining the substance of 
European parliamentary electoral rights for the users of such rights (within the confines of the 
Directive), they are nonetheless bound to respect the general principles of EU law and are precluded 
from treating different categories of EU citizens who are in the same circumstances in a way that 
discriminates between them.  
 
Moreover in 2002, nearly 50 years after the initial promise was made, some significant progress was 
made in respect of uniform electoral procedure. 49 Council Decision 2002/772/EC, although leaving 
a great deal at the discretion of the Member States, went some way towards standardizing elements 
of European Parliament election procedure.50 The Decision amended the 1976 Direct Elections Act51 
and, amongst other things, introduced proportional representation for European Parliament elections. 
Member States were, however, left with discretion to implement this amendment by way of either 
the adoption of a list or single transferable vote system. Other notable amendments made by the 
Decision were the elimination of the dual mandate of European Parliament members such that they 
were no longer responsible to their Member State parliaments and the introduction of a requirement 
that any minimum threshold for the allocation of seats to a party set by a Member State should not 
exceed 5%.52 
 
The most significant recent development in the evolution of European parliamentary electoral rights 
has, of course, been ushered in with the 2007 Treaty of Lisbon. The major innovation of the Treaty 
of Lisbon was to link the citizenship provisions in the TFEU (i.e. in this context, Articles 20(2)(b) 
and 22(2) TFEU) to the new provisions on democratic representation in Title II of the reworked TEU 
(i.e. Article 10 TEU).53 The Treaty developments can perhaps best be understood as a codification of 
the position taken by the ECrtHR and CJEU in a number of important cases which had broadly 
confirmed that European citizens have a right, as a matter of democratic principle, to vote for "their" 
                                                 
49 For more detail on the debate around uniform electoral procedure, see inter alia: Resolution on the draft uniform 
electoral procedure for the election of Members of the European Parliament OJ C 115, 26.4.199; Resolution on the 
European Parliament' s guidelines for the draft uniform electoral procedure OJ C 280, 28.10.1991; Resolution on a draft 
uniform electoral procedure for the election of members of the European Parliament OJ C 87, 5.4.1982; and Case C-
41/92 Liberal Democrats v European Parliament. 
50 Council Decision 2002/772/EC, Euratom (OJ L 283, 21.10.2002, p. 1) 
51 The 1976 Act was also amended on another occasion, in 1993. The amendments in 1993, adopted partly to account for 
the unification of Germany and the planned enlargement, introduced a scheme for the allocation of seats per Member 
State (Decision 93/81 (OJ L 33, 9.2.1993, p. 15)).  
52 Although Member States are indeed left with wide discretion in terms of implementation under the 1976 Act, this does 
not mean that the widest possible application of the Act’s provisions will always be favoured. A recent and notable 
example of this can be found in two cases heard before the German Constitutional Court on the interpretation of s(2)7 of 
the Europawahlgesetz (Cases BVerfG of 9 November 2011, 2 BvC 4/10, 2 BvC 6/10, 2 BvC 8/10). Article 2(a) of the 
1976 Act provides that: “Member States may set a minimum threshold for the allocation of seats. At national level this 
threshold may not exceed 5 per cent of votes cast.” In spite of this permission under the Act, the German Constitutional 
Court ruled that just such a 5 per cent hurdle applicable under s2(7) Europawahlgesetz (designed to stop small parties 
from entering the European Parliament) was unconstitutional and therefore void.  
53 J Shaw, ‘Citizenship: contrasting dynamics at the interface of integration and constitutionalism’, in P Craig and G de 
Burca (eds), The Evolution of EU Law, (Oxford University Press, 2011) 575-609 
 12 
parliament.54 The Treaty of Lisbon, by linking the rights of non-national Union citizens to equal 
treatment (i.e. the rights of the ‘Community voter’) to the rights to democratic participation and 
representation (i.e. the ideal of direct universal suffrage stemming from the Treaty of Paris), for the 
first time, arguably established the universal right of Union citizens, regardless of whether they are 
‘mobile’ or ‘static’, to participate in the democratic life of the union by voting or standing for 
elections to the European Parliament. Thus, as set out above, Article 10(2) TEU provides that 
“Citizens are directly represented at Union level in the European Parliament” and Article 10(3) 
TEU states that “Every citizen shall have the right to participate in the democratic life of the Union.” 
 
Another recent development has come in the form of an amendment to Directive 93/109/EC. The 
new Directive 2013/1/EU, adopted on 20 December 2012, makes it easier for non-national EU 
citizens to stand for election in the host State.55 The amending Directive eliminates the requirement 
on non-national candidates to secure an attestation from their home State as to their eligibility to 
stand for election. There was some concern that candidates were having trouble identifying the 
relevant authorities empowered to issue such attestation. The Directive has simplified this procedure 
for the candidate by shifting the burden to the Member States. Candidates are now only required to 
sign a formal declaration that they are eligible to stand, and the State of residence will then be 
required to request the candidate's home State to confirm. The home State will then have the 
obligation of verifying that the candidate has no judicial or administrative decisions against his/her 
name depriving the candidate of the right to stand. If the home State does not respond to the 
requesting State within five days, the candidate will automatically be admitted.  
 
This amendment was based on an original (and much broader) 2006 proposal from the European 
Commission, which was re-launched and stripped down (i.e. removing a proposal on the subject of 
double voting which had proved contentious amongst Member States), in 2011. The new rules will 
now be implemented in time for the European Parliament elections in 2014. 
 
Although they will not be dealt with in extensive detail in this Chapter, the most recent debates on 
the subject of European parliamentary electoral rights, revolve around issues of voter participation, 
participatory democracy and the electoral rights of physically disabled persons and persons with 
mental health impairments (which will be discussed in more detail below).56  
 
II. Scope of Application 
 
The substance of the rights guaranteed by Article 39 CFR will be dealt with in more detail in the 
following Sections; this Section merely sets out, in broad and abstract terms, the scope of Article 39 
CFR. 
 
A discussion on the scope of Article 39 CFR can be usefully distributed between ‘territorial scope’, 
‘jurisdictional scope’, ‘vertical scope’, ‘personal scope’ and ‘protective scope’:  
 
- By territorial scope, we should understand that while Article 39 CFR applies to all Union 
citizens, it is within the competence of Member States to limit the rights it guarantees by 
residence requirements; 
 
                                                 
54 See Matthews v United Kingdom, N° 24833/94, (1999) – discussed in more detail below. See also House of Lords 
Select Committee on Constitution Written Evidence, Memorandum by Professor J Shaw, Salvesen Chair of European 
Institutions, University of Edinburgh. 
55 Directive 2013/1/EU, OJ [2013] L 26/27.  
56 See for more information see Fundamental rights: challenges and achievements in 2011, Chapter 7: Participation of 
EU citizens in the Union's democratic functioning, FRA – European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2012, 
available from http://fra.europa.eu. 
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- By jurisdictional scope, we should recognise that Article 39 CFR will (generally) not apply in 
jurisdictions which fall outwith EU Treaty framework or where the European Parliament 
cannot be characterised as a ‘legislature’; 
 
- By vertical scope, we should recall that, in the current state of EU law, it is for the Member 
States to determine who to include in the electorate for the purposes of the rights specified at 
Article 39 CFR and that they have a wide margin of appreciation in this respect; 
 
- By personal scope, we should understand that, as noted earlier, Article 39 CFR applies to 
both static and mobile Union citizens and does not require the exercise of free movement 
rights in order to be activated; 57 and 
 
- By protective scope, we should observe that, on the basis of CJEU and ECrtHR 
jurisprudence, it is prudent to view Article 39 CFR primarily as an EU law non-
discrimination and equal treatment right and secondarily, as a guarantee against the irrational 
implementation or application by Member States of the electoral rights which Article 39 
CFR guarantees. 
 
Having set the broad parameters, in the following Section, we will explore the scope of Article 39 
CFR in more detail as we try to understand the substance of the rights which this provision 
guarantees.  
 
 
III. Specific Provisions 
 
The aim in this Section is to try to understand more about the likely interpretation of Article 39 CFR 
and the substance of the rights which are guaranteed. It will therefore be necessary to explore, in a 
little bit of detail, a range of very important cases that have arisen from the ECrtHR and the CJEU on 
the subject of electoral rights for European parliamentary elections i.e. Matthews v United 
Kingdom, 58 Spain v United Kingdom 59 and Eman and Sevinger v College van burgemeester en 
wethouders van Den Haag.60  
 
 
Important Cases 
 
Matthews v United Kingdom 
 
In 1994, Ms Denise Matthews, a British citizen and a resident of Gibraltar,61 applied at her local 
Electoral Registration Office to register as a voter in the 1994 European Parliament elections. The 
Electoral Registration Officer replied in the following terms: 
 
The provisions of Annex II of the EC Act on Direct Elections of 1976 limit the franchise for European 
parliamentary elections to the United Kingdom. This Act was agreed by all member States and has 
treaty status. This means that Gibraltar will not be included in the franchise for the European 
parliamentary elections. 
 
                                                 
57 See Matthews v United Kingdom, above at n. 54, Spain v the United Kingdom, above at n. 9, and the Treaty of Lisbon. 
58 Ibid. Matthews v United Kingdom. 
59 See Spain v the United Kingdom, above at n. 9. 
60 Case C-300/04 Eman and Sevinger v College van burgemeester en wethouders van Den Haag [2006] ECR I-8055. 
61 Gibraltar is a dependent territory of the United Kingdom. It forms part of Her Majesty the Queen’s Dominions, but not 
part of the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom parliament has the ultimate authority to legislate for Gibraltar, but in 
practice exercises it rarely. 
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Sure enough, Annex II of the Direct Elections Act provided that “[t]he United Kingdom will apply 
the provisions of this Act only in respect of the United Kingdom”. Ms Matthews took her case to the 
EComHR claiming that there had been a breach of her right to participate in elections to choose “the 
legislature” contrary to Article 3, Protocol 1 of the ECHR. For convenience, Article 3 provides: 
 
The High Contracting Parties undertake to hold free elections at reasonable intervals by secret ballot, 
under conditions which will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of 
the legislature. 
 
[Emphasis added] 
 
It should be mentioned that the TEC applied to Gibraltar by virtue of what is now Article 355(3) 
TFEU 62, which provided that the Treaty applied to the European territories for whose external 
relations a Member State was responsible. While there are some areas of EU law that did not, at the 
time, have effect in Gibraltar, European Community legislation concerning, inter alia, such matters 
as free movement of persons, services and capital, health, the environment and consumer protection 
all applied in Gibraltar. 
 
The argument between the parties was framed around the question of whether the European 
Parliament, at the relevant time, had the characteristics of a ‘legislature’ in Gibraltar. The UK 
contended that, at the time, the European Parliament continued to lack both of the most fundamental 
attributes of a legislature: the power to initiate legislation and the power to adopt it. 
 
Ultimately, the ECrtHR held that even though Gibraltar was excluded from certain areas of 
Community activity, there remained significant areas where Community activity had a direct impact 
in Gibraltar. 63  The European Parliament's involvement in specific legislative processes and the 
general democratic supervision of the EU's activities was enough to render it part of the legislature of 
Gibraltar for the purposes of Article 3 and, on that basis, there had been a violation of Article 3 as the 
very essence of Ms Matthews' right to vote to choose the legislature had been denied.64 
 
Spain v United Kingdom 
 
As just noted above, in Matthews v United Kingdom, the ECrtHR had held that the UK was in breach 
of Article 3, Protocol 1 of the ECHR in failing to hold European Parliament elections in Gibraltar. 
To comply with the ECrtHR decision and for the purpose of holding such elections in future, the UK 
enacted the ‘European Parliament (Representation) Act 2003’,65 which made Gibraltar part of the 
constituency of south-west England and granted the right to vote to persons registered in Gibraltar, 
including both EU citizens and, in line with the constitutional traditions in the UK, also so-called 
“Qualifying Commonwealth Citizens”. 66 In the context of Gibraltar, this meant that a group of 
around 200 Commonwealth citizens (i.e. not citizens of the Union) residing in Gibraltar were 
rendered eligible to vote for the European Parliament elections.  
 
Spain objected to a number of measures that the UK had adopted to implement the Matthews case, 
but chiefly to the inclusion of Commonwealth citizens in the franchise, and requested the 
Commission to bring an enforcement action against the UK. However, making no headway with the 
                                                 
62 Formerly Article 299(4) TEC. 
63 See Matthews v United Kingdom, above at n. 54, at paragraph 53. 
64 Ibid. at paragraph 54.  
65 European Parliament (Representation) Act 2003 c. 7, Part 2. 
66 In the UK all Commonwealth citizens who are resident in the UK and who have leave to enter or remain in the UK or 
do not require leave to enter or remain in the UK (“Qualifying Commonwealth Citizens”) are entitled to vote in all forms 
of elections in the UK. See Representation of the People Act 1983 ss1 and 2; Scotland Act 1998 s11; Government of 
Wales Act 2006 s12; The Northern Ireland Assembly (Elections) Order 2001 s4(1); Elected Authorities (Northern Ireland) 
Act 1989 s1(c); Local Government Act 2000 s43(1)(a); and Local Government Act 2000 s45(4). 
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Commission, Spain brought an enforcement action itself under Article 226 TEC (now Article 258 
TFEU). Spain contended, inter alia, that by including Commonwealth citizens, the UK was in breach 
of Articles 18967 and 19068 TEC, under which the right of suffrage was, Spain argued, confined to 
EU citizens. Spain also sought to rely on Article 19(2) TEC (now 22(2) TFEU), asserting that the 
language of the provision expressly confined the right to “citizens of the Union”. In support of its 
argument, Spain also referred to Article 39 CFR. Spain noted that the provision “uses the expression 
“[e]very citizen of the Union”, and not the term “everyone” or an expression referring to national 
law”.69 Spain also contended that the right to vote of a national of a non-Member State cannot be 
described as a “human right” or a “fundamental freedom”.70 Meanwhile, the European Commission, 
in support of the UKs case, argued that the wording of Article 39 CFR should not be viewed as 
requiring the right to vote to be limited to Union citizens.71 
 
The ECJ, as it then was, held that the Treaty did not expressly state who was entitled to vote in 
European Parliamentary elections, nor did it state that its provisions were confined to EU citizens 
alone.72 The Court maintained that Article 19(2) TEC was a rule of equal treatment between citizens 
of the Union and could not be interpreted in a way that would prevent a Member State from 
extending the right to vote to those with whom it had a close link.73 The final choice of who to 
include in the electorate was, the Court said, “in the current state of Community law”, a matter for 
individual Member States to determine. 74  The Court supported its position by referring to the 
“constitutional traditions” of the UK (i.e. enfranchising resident Commonwealth citizens in all UK 
elections).75 The UK had therefore not been in breach of the Treaty by including Commonwealth 
citizens in the Gibraltar electorate. The Court made no reference to Article 39 CFR – this being 
before the Treaty of Lisbon.76  
  
 
Eman and Sevinger v College van burgemeester en wethouders van Den Haag 
 
In 2004, Mr Michiel Eman and Mr Oslin Sevinger, two Netherlands citizens, resident on the island 
of Aruba, 77 applied to be entered on the register which was maintained in the Netherlands, for 
European Parliament elections. The College van Burgemeester en Wethouders (i.e. the municipal 
executive) of Den Haag, rejected their application on the basis of the Keiswet (i.e. the Netherlands 
Electoral Act). The Kieswet granted the right to vote in European Parliament elections to all 
                                                 
67 I.e. “The European Parliament, which shall consist of representatives of the peoples of the States brought together in 
the Community, shall exercise the powers conferred upon it by this Treaty”. 
68 I.e. “The representatives in the European Parliament of the peoples of the States brought together in the Community 
shall be elected by direct universal suffrage […]”. 
69 See Spain v the United Kingdom, above at n.9, at paragraph 42. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Ibid. at paragraph 56 – although it should be noted that the Court went on to say that the United Kingdom and the 
Commission interpreted Article 39 CFR as not permitting the right to vote currently conferred by a Member State on 
third-country nationals to be impaired. This begs the question: what would the position be if a Member State, let’s say the 
UK, chose to enfranchise a new group of third country nationals in European Parliament elections? 
72 Ibid. at paragraphs 65 to 70. 
73 Ibid. at paragraph 76. 
74 Ibid. at paragraph 78. 
75 Ibid. at paragraph 79. 
76 It has been suggested that this omission was on account of the Courts desire not to accord too much weight to a 
document which was not, at the time, legally binding. See LFM Besselink, ‘Case C–145/04, Spain v. United Kingdom, 
judgment of the Grand Chamber of 12 September 2006; Case C–300/04, Eman and Sevinger, judgment of the Grand 
Chamber of 12 September 2006; ECtHR (Third Section), 6 September 2007, Applications Nos. 17173/07 and 17180/07, 
Oslin Benito Sevinger and Michiel Godfried Eman v. the Netherlands (Sevinger and Eman), (2008) 3 Common Market 
Law review 787–813. 
77 Aruba is one of the four constituent countries that form the Kingdom of the Netherlands, together with the Netherlands, 
Curaçao, and Sint Maarten whose citizens share a Dutch nationality. The legislature in Aruba is largely autonomous; 
however, there are a few areas, such as foreign affairs, defence and nationality which are still regulated by acts of the 
Staten-Generaal (legislature for the Kingdom of the Netherlands). 
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Netherlands nationals with the exception of those resident in Aruba and in the Netherlands 
Antilles.78 Mr Eman and Mr Sevinger instituted proceedings against the decision of the municipal 
executive before the Raad van State (i.e. the Council of State),79 claiming that the Netherlands 
Electoral Act infringed the provisions in the TEC on Citizenship,80 and infringed Articles 18981 and 
19082 TEC read in conjunction with Article 3, Protocol 1 of the ECHR which, they argued, granted 
the right to vote in European Parliament elections to all citizens of Member States, including those 
residing in overseas countries. The matter was referred to the ECJ for clarification, inter alia, as to 
the correct interpretation of the relevant Treaty provisions and, essentially, seeking to ascertain 
whether a Member State must grant the right to vote in European elections to persons who, although 
possessing its nationality, resided in an overseas territory which was covered by special association 
arrangements with the Community. 
 
It should be briefly mentioned that Aruba was an overseas country or territory (“OCT”) for the 
purposes of the TEC. This meant that EC law did not, in principle, apply to it expect in relation to the 
special regime contained in Part Four of the TEC (i.e. Article 299(3) TEC (now Article 355(2) 
TFEU), which should be distinguished from the separate provisions, mentioned above, for Member 
States’ European territories, such as Gibraltar, under Article 299(4) TEC). 
 
The ECJ held that persons, who possessed the nationality of a Member State, and who resided or 
lived in a territory which was one of the OCTs referred to in Article 299(3) TEC, could rely on the 
rights conferred on citizens of the Union in the Treaty.83 Furthermore, the Treaty did not expressly 
state who was entitled to vote in European Parliamentary elections84 and in the current state of 
Community law, the definition of the persons entitled to vote and to stand for election fell within the 
competence of each Member State acting in compliance with Community law.85  
 
The ECJ further noted that Member States were not required to hold elections to the European 
Parliament in OCTs under the TEC and that since the provisions of the Treaty did not apply to OCTs, 
the European Parliament could not be regarded as their “legislature” within the meaning of Article 3, 
Protocol 1 of the ECHR.86 The Court further stated that the TEC did not confer an unconditional 
right to vote and to stand as a candidate in elections to the European Parliament and that, in view of 
ECrtHR jurisprudence, it was not inappropriate for Member States to use residence as a criterion for 
determining who could vote and stand in such elections.87However, such provisions must not be 
applied arbitrarily, unreasonably or in contravention of the principle of equal treatment.88 It should 
be noted that the reference to considerations of reasonableness and arbitrariness was made in the 
context of a discussion on ECHR jurisprudence on Article 3, Protocol 1 ECHR. It is notable that the 
Court relied on such jurisprudence to come to its conclusion that it was not inappropriate for Member 
States to use residence as a criterion. 
                                                 
78 Besselink, above, n. 76. 
79 In the Netherlands, the Council of State is a constitutionally established advisory body to the government. 
80 See the Treaty Establishing the European Community, Part Two (Articles 17 – 22) instituting citizenship of the Union 
for all Member State nationals and articulating certain Citizens’ rights such as the right to equal treatment for non-
national Union citizens wishing to vote in European Parliament elections in the Member State in which they reside 
(Article 19(2) TEC).  
81 I.e. “The European Parliament, which shall consist of representatives of the peoples of the States brought together in 
the Community, shall exercise the powers conferred upon it by this Treaty”. 
82 I.e. “The representatives in the European Parliament of the peoples of the States brought together in the Community 
shall be elected by direct universal suffrage […]”. 
83 Above at n. 60at paragraphs 27 to 29.  
84 Ibid. at paragraphs 40 to 44.  
85 Ibid. at paragraph 45.  
86 Ibid. at paragraph 46 to 48. 
87 Ibid. at paragraph 51 to 55. 
88 Which as one of the general principles of Community law, requires that comparable situations must not be treated 
differently and that different situations must not be treated in the same way unless such treatment was objectively 
justified – see paragraphs 54 to 60. 
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Finally, the ECJ noted that it had not been demonstrated, in this case, that the principle of equal 
treatment had not been infringed given that all those Netherlands expatriate citizens who resided in 
other parts of the world (i.e. outside of the Netherlands OCTs), were entitled to vote in European 
Parliament elections, while those residing in OCTs, such as Aruba, were disenfranchised.89 
 
 
The Scope of Article 39 CFR 
 
Having set out the relevant case law, we can now explore, by reference to that case law, the likely 
scope of Article 39 CFR. The case law illustrates how the CJEU has been very cautious in defining 
the scope of the rights guaranteed under EU law. 
 
With respect to jurisdictional scope, in Matthews, the ECrtHR made it plain that the right to vote and 
stand in European parliamentary elections should be limited to jurisdictions in relation to which the 
European Parliament can accurately be characterised as a ‘legislature’. Meanwhile, in Eman and 
Sevinger, the ECJ confirmed that since the provisions of the Treaty did not apply to OCTs, the 
European Parliament could not be regarded as a “legislature” in such territories within the meaning 
of Article 3, Protocol 1 of the ECHR. This jurisprudence limits the scope of Article 39 CFR by 
reference to the legal reach of the EU Treaty framework i.e. Union citizens who do not reside in 
jurisdictions that are bound by the Treaties will not have an absolute right vote and stand in 
European Parliament elections and will only be enfranchised where the relevant Member State has 
determined to enfranchise them.  
 
With respect to vertical scope, it is clear from the jurisprudence that, in absence of any further Treaty 
developments, it is for the Member States, and not the CJEU, to determine the contours of the 
electorate for the purposes of European parliamentary elections. In Spain v UK, the Court framed its 
reasoning in terms of the “competence of Member States” to extend the right to vote to those with 
whom they have a “close link” and in terms of the “current state of Community law” and the 
“constitutional traditions” of the UK. Again, in Eman and Sevinger, the Court stipulated that, “in the 
current state of Community law, the definition of the persons entitled to vote and to stand for election 
falls within the competence of each Member State”.90 The reliance by the Court on this line of 
reasoning illustrates the deference it feels bound to give, as a consequence of the current EU law 
framework, to the constitutional arrangements of the Member States. In this sense, Article 39 CFR 
can be viewed as vertically limited in that any vertical bond that exists between citizens and the 
Union in this context is necessarily mediated by national law.  
 
The discretion granted to Member States in this respect also permits the circumscription of the 
territorial scope of Article 39 CFR. This was confirmed by the CJEU in Eman and Sevinger, where 
the Court made clear that: 
 
[T]here is nothing which precludes the Member States from defining, in compliance with Community 
law, the conditions of the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in elections to the European 
Parliament by reference to the criterion of residence in the territory in which the elections are held.91  
 
However, as discussed above, Article 39 CFR does appear to be pervasive in terms of its personal 
scope (i.e. it applies to both static and mobile Union citizens). Certainly the Treaty of Lisbon seems 
to elevate what was originally a right of equal treatment to mobile EU citizens, into a right, albeit not 
absolute, of all Union citizens, to participate in the democratic life of the Union by voting and 
                                                 
89 Ibid.  
90 Ibid. at paragraph 45. 
91 Ibid. at paragraph 61. 
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standing in European Parliament elections. However, Eman and Sevinger and Spain v UK were 
decided prior to the changes brought in by the Treaty of Lisbon, and so the exact contours of this 
right in light of these Treaty amendments are yet to be settled out by the CJEU. 
 
The question that remains, however, is ‘what is the protective scope of Article 39 CFR?’ In other 
words, once we have taken into account the various ways in which the electoral rights that Article 39 
purports to guarantee can be limited by reference to territory, jurisdiction and the current EU law 
framework (i.e. personal and vertical scope), what remains of the substance of such rights? In this 
respect, the jurisprudence reveals not only the right to non-discrimination on grounds of nationality – 
as explicitly provided for in the relevant EU law provisions – but also, an equal treatment principle, 
which is not limited by reference to nationality, and which perhaps hints at a guarantee against the 
arbitrary or unreasonable application or implementation by Member States, of European 
parliamentary electoral rights. 
 
Indeed, the willingness of the ECJ, in Eman and Sevinger, to extend general principles of EU law (i.e. 
equal treatment) to protect citizens of the Union, even though such citizens fell outwith the 
jurisdictional scope (as defined in Section DII, above) of the EU Treaty framework, is the true 
innovation of this case. Furthermore, the reference made by the Court to considerations of the 
arbitrariness and rationality of relevant legal provisions adds another dimension to the equal 
treatment principle in this context.  
 
The question that follows from this is to what extent the protective scope of Article 39 CFR, 
emerging from Eman and Sevinger, can be said to also cover third country nationals to whom 
European parliamentary electoral rights have been extended by virtue of national law? In other words, 
what happens when the principles emerging from Eman and Sevinger are combined with those 
emerging from Spain v UK? Once third country nationals (who are also, by definition, not Union 
citizens) residing in Member States or territories covered by European parliamentary rights have 
been brought within the purview of Article 39 because a Member States has exercised its discretion, 
is there, under EU law, an obligation on the Member State to apply those provisions in a manner that 
is rational, consistent and in accordance with the principle of equal treatment? Moreover, if such 
third country nationals are afforded some form of guarantee of equal treatment or protection against 
irrationality and arbitrariness, does such protection derive from Article 39 CFR, from Article 3, 
Protocol 1 of the ECHR, or from general principles of EU law? Unfortunately, the answers to these 
questions remain presently out of reach and can only be clarified CJEU. 
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IV. Limitations and Derogations  
 
a. Limitations and derogations from Article 39 CFR under the Charter 
 
The Charter provides at Article 52(1) that: 
 
Any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by this Charter must be provided for 
by law and respect the essence of those rights and freedoms. Subject to the principle of proportionality, 
limitations may be made only if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest 
recognised by the Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others. 
 
This provision remains to be interpreted by the CJEU, however, given that by virtue of Articles 52(2) 
and (3) CFR, Charter rights (like Article 39 CFR) which are provided for under the Treaties or which 
correspond to rights existing under the ECHR, are to be interpreted within the limits of existing law 
(see more on this directly below), it is not likely that this provision will have any dramatic novel 
effect in the short term.  
 
b. Limitations and derogations from Article 39 CFR on grounds of EU law 
 
The likely limitations on Article 39 CFR under EU law have already been extensively explored in the 
context of the above discussion on the likely scope of the provision. Consequently here we will only 
discuss derogations under EU law.  
 
As has already been noted above, in accordance with Article 52(2) of the Charter, Article 39 applies 
under the conditions laid down in and within the limits defined by the Treaties. Moreover, as also 
noted above, Directive 93/109/EC (which implements the relevant Treaty provisions) provides scope 
for derogation at Article 14.  
 
The Directive provides for exceptions to the principle of equal treatment between national and non-
national voters where this is deemed to be justified by complications which are specific to a Member 
State. Such expectations are deemed to be justified where the proportion of Union citizens of voting 
age, resident in a Member State of which they are not a national, is much greater than the average 
within the Union as a whole. Article 14(1) provides: 
 
If […] in a given Member State, the proportion of citizens of the Union of voting age who reside in it 
but are not nationals of it exceeds 20 % of the total number of citizens of the Union residing there 
who are of voting age, that Member State may, by way of derogation […]:  
 
(a) restrict the right to vote to Community voters who have resided in that Member State for a 
minimum period, which may not exceed five years;  
 
(b) restrict the right to stand as a candidate to Community nationals entitled to stand as 
candidates who have resided in that Member State for a minimum period, which may not 
exceed 10 years.  
 
In effect, this derogation is only granted to and applied by Luxembourg, where in 2007, the 
proportion of non-national citizens of the Union, of voting age, was 37.87% of the total number of 
Union citizens of voting age.92 
                                                 
92 For more information, see: Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and to the Council of 20 
December 2007 on granting a derogation pursuant to Article 19(2) of the EC Treaty, presented under Article 14(3) of 
Directive 93/109/EC on the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in elections to the European Parliament (COM(2007) 
846) and Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and to the Council of 27 January 2003 on granting a 
derogation pursuant to Article 19(2) of the EC Treaty, presented under Article 14(3) of Directive 93/109/EC on the right 
to vote and to stand as a candidate in elections to the European Parliament (COM(2003) 31). 
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c. Limitation of Article 39 CFR by virtue of the ECHR 
 
Although not explicitly referred to in the explanation of Article 39 CFR, Article 52(3) provides that: 
 
In so far as this Charter contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by the Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the meaning and scope of those rights 
shall be the same as those laid down by the said Convention. This provision shall not prevent Union 
law providing more extensive protection. 
 
It would not be difficult to argue that the rights provided for by Article 39 CFR (certainly the 
universal suffrage right at Article 39(2)) correspond to the rights articulated at Article 3, Protocol 1 
ECHR. Certainly, Matthews v United Kingdom would suggest that this is the case. Moreover, in 
Eman and Sevinger the ECJ referred to ECHR jurisprudence concerning the limitation of Article 3, 
Protocol 1 on grounds of residence and linked this jurisprudence to the right to vote and stand in 
European Parliament elections. The ECJ asserted that: 
 
Having regard to [ECHR jurisprudence], the criterion linked to residence does not appear, in principle, 
to be inappropriate to determine who has the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in elections to 
the European Parliament.93 
 
This cross-reference quite clearly suggests a correspondence between the right to vote and to stand as 
a candidate in elections to the European Parliament as contained at Article 39 CFR and the rights 
guaranteed by Article 3, Protocol 1 ECHR.  
 
It would not then be overly presumptuous to suggest that the limitations to Article 3, Protocol 1 
ECHR as expressed within the ECrtHR case law (such as limitations on the basis of residence) would 
likely apply to Article 39 CFR (with the caveat that Union law may – although it does not currently – 
provide more extensive protection). Under the following headings we will explore the main 
categories of limitation that exist under ECHR case law. 
 
Limitation on grounds of criminal convictions/incarceration 
 
Recent ECrtHR cases such as Hirst v the United Kingdom (No 2)94 and Scoppola v Italy (No 3)95 
have confirmed that it is within the competence of States to disenfranchise prisoners so long as there 
is no general and automatic disenfranchisement of all serving prisoners. 
 
Several EU Member States, including Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Spain and Sweden have no form of 
disenfranchisement for imprisoned offenders. In other States, disenfranchisement depends on the 
nature of the offence committed or the duration of the sentence; while in yet others prisoners are only 
allowed to vote at certain elections. However, currently, the UK, Bulgaria, Estonia and Hungary all 
apply a blanket disenfranchisement in respect of all serving prisoners.96  
                                                 
93 Above at n.60 at paragraphs 54 to 55. 
94 Hirst v United Kingdom (No 2), N° 74025/01 (2006). 
95 Scoppola v Italy (No.3), N° 126/05 (2012). 
96 The House of Commons Library Standard Note, ‘Prisoners’ voting rights’, SN/PC/01764, 5 November 2012; and the 
House of Commons Library Standard Note, ‘Prisoners’ voting rights’, SN/PC/1747, 17 May 2011. The UK has refused 
to lift its current disenfranchisement of all serving prisoners (except those on remand) and during Prime Minister’s 
questions, on 24 October 2012, David Cameron told MPs that, “No one should be under any doubt - prisoners are not 
getting the vote under this government.” The UK had been given six months from the date of the Grand Chamber 
judgment in Scoppola above n. 95 (22 May 2012) to put forward proposals with a view to dealing with the established 
problems with UK law from the perspective the ECHR, and draft legislation – which stands little present prospect of 
being adopted by Parliament – was duly put forward in November 2012, which offers a number of options which would 
satisfy the Court of Human Rights, such as allowing prisoners serving sentences of less than four years to vote: see J 
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Thus far, the issue of the effect of Article 39 CFR in relation to disenfranchisement of prisoners from 
voting in European Parliament elections has not been tested, as the cases have concentrated on the 
interface between the ECHR and national elections. But this is set to change in 2013, with a case 
before the UK Supreme Court bringing together two cases – one argued in Scotland and one argued 
in England.97 The issues that this could raise for the interpretation of Article 39 are discussed in more 
detail in Section E. 
 
 
Limitation on grounds of residence requirements 
 
As has been discussed extensively above, both the ECrtHR and the CJEU have determined that it is 
within the competence of States to apply residence requirements to electoral rights. 
 
In Doyle v the United Kingdom, the ECrtHR has established that stipulating a residence or length-of-
residence requirement for citizens wishing to vote did not fall foul of Article 3, Protocol 1 ECHR.98 
In Eman and Sevinger, it was held that it was not inappropriate for Member States to use residence 
as a criterion for determining who could vote and stand in such elections.99 
 
Limitation on grounds of mental health problems 
As with persons convicted of offences, persons suffering from mental impairments are legally 
disenfranchised in the majority of EU states, which still link the loss of legal capacity to 
disenfranchisement 100  There seem to be three broad approaches to mental impairment: total 
exclusion, case-by-case consideration and full participation. 
 
In 2010, in Alajos Kiss v Hungary, the ECrtHR overturned a blanket provision which denied voting 
rights to mentally disabled people under partial guardianship in Hungary.101 The ECrtHR held that: 
 
The Court cannot accept […] that an absolute bar on voting by any person under partial guardianship, 
irrespective of his or her actual faculties, falls within an acceptable margin of appreciation. Indeed, while 
the Court reiterates that this margin of appreciation is wide, it is not all-embracing […] In addition, if a 
restriction on fundamental rights applies to a particularly vulnerable group in society, who have suffered 
considerable discrimination in the past, such as the mentally disabled, then the State's margin of 
appreciation is substantially narrower and it must have very weighty reasons for the restrictions in 
question.102 
 
The Court went on to say that “the treatment as a single class of those with intellectual or mental 
disabilities is a questionable classification, and the curtailment of their rights must be subject to 
strict scrutiny.” 103  The Court thus concluded that “an indiscriminate removal of voting rights, 
without an individualised judicial evaluation and solely based on a mental disability necessitating 
partial guardianship, cannot be considered compatible with the legitimate grounds for restricting the 
right to vote.”104 On the basis of this decision, Hungary adopted a new Basic Law which entered into 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Rozenburg, ‘Prisoner Votes: Government is playing for more time’, The Guardian, 22 November 2012, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/2012/nov/22/prisoner-votes-government-more-time.  
97 See McGeoch v Lord President of the Council [2011] CSIH 67 and Chester v Secretary of State for Justice [2010] 
EWCA Civ 1439. 
98 Doyle v the United Kingdom , N° 30158/06, (2007). 
99 Above at n. 60 at paragraphs 51 to 55. 
100 Above at n.56 at p189. See also for additional details Fundamental Rights Agency, The right to political participation 
of persons with mental health problems and persons with intellectual disabilities, Report, October 2010. 
101 Alajos Kiss v Hungary, N° 38832/06, (2010). 
102 Ibid. at paragraph 42. 
103 Ibid. at paragraph 44. 
104 Ibid. 
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force on 1 January 2012 by virtue of which a Judge is to decide on a case-by-case basis whether 
guardianship warrants disenfranchisement.  
 
The Alajos Kiss ruling casts doubt on the total exclusions applied by a vast number of EU Member 
States.105  
 
d. Limitation of Article 39 CFR by virtue of disability 
 
The limitations in the context of disability are not legal impediments, but practical impediments.  
 
The EU ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in 2011 which, as 
noted above, provides at Article 29: 
 
States Parties shall guarantee to persons with disabilities political rights and the opportunity to enjoy 
them on an equal basis with others […] 
 
Furthermore in November 2011, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe adopted a 
Recommendation on the participation of persons with disabilities in political and public life which 
calls on Council of Europe Member States to guarantee persons with disabilities the right to vote and 
the right to stand for election in a manner equal to that of any other citizen.106 
 
However, in 2011, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, reported that the right to 
vote, for persons with disabilities, was a matter of serious concern and went so far as to make 
dedicated recommendations for five EU Member States (Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland and 
Latvia).107 Disability will likely be an impediment to the effective exercise of Article 39 CFR rights 
throughout the EU, for example, by way of lack access to polling stations108 or the lack of Braille 
templates for blind voters.109 
 
 
 
V. Remedies  
 
While no express remedies for breach of article 39 CFR are stipulated, there are hints in the Charter, 
in the case law and in Directive 93/109/EC.  
 
The right to an effective remedy as per Article 47 CFR (e.g. where an individual has been refused 
entry on the electoral register), would logically require the inclusion of that individual on the relevant 
electoral register. However, that leaves open the question of what would be an appropriate remedy 
where the relevant election has already taken place and the individual concerned has been 
irrevocably disenfranchised with respect to that election.  
 
This point was discussed by the ECJ, as it was called at the time, in the Eman and Sevinger case. The 
Court states, at paragraph 68: 
 
[I]t is for the national law of each Member State to determine the rules allowing legal redress for a 
person who, because of a national provision that is contrary to Community law, has not been entered 
on the electoral register for the election of the members of the European Parliament […] and has 
therefore been excluded from participation in those elections. Those remedies, which may include 
                                                 
105 Above at n.56 at p189. 
106 Above at n.56 at p186. 
107 Ibid. 
108 Ibid. In Latvia in 2011 only 46% of polling stations were accessible, in the Netherlands, 83% and in Poland , just 33%. 
109 As is the case in Portugal. 
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compensation for the loss caused by the infringement of Community law for which the State may be 
held responsible, must comply with the principles of equivalence and effectiveness.110 
 
It appears then that the likely remedies for a breach of Article 39 CFR, would either be inclusion on 
the electoral register or, where the election has already taken place, whichever remedies would be 
applicable in the relevant Member State (which may include, but would not be limited to, 
compensation for loss). This issue is set to be considered in the UK in McGeoch and Chester, in the 
context of prisoner disenfranchisement.111 While a number of claims brought before the UK courts 
already on the basis of the UK’s failure to implement the original Hirst (No. 2) judgment of the 
ECtHR have ‘succeeded’ in the sense that the courts have recognised the incompatibility of UK with 
the ECHR,112 no meaningful remedies, such as damages, have yet to be awarded. This could change 
if claimants are denied their EU ‘right to vote’ and Article 39 and the normative force of EU law is 
invoked, 113 and substantial damages may be awarded in the future (or the threat of substantial 
damages actions under the shadow of EU law may finally bring the UK to comply with an original 
finding of the incompatibility of UK law with the ECHR on the part of the European Court of 
Human Rights). 
 
Furthermore, Directive 93/109/EC, Article 11(2) provides:  
 
Should a person be refused entry on the electoral roll or his application to stand as a candidate be 
rejected, the person concerned shall be entitled to legal remedies on the same terms as the legislation 
of the Member State of residence prescribes for voters and persons entitled to stand as candidates who 
are its nationals.] 
 
The principle of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality therefore also applies to any remedies 
that are provided under national law.  
 
 
E. Evaluation  
 
The same essential rights were at once claimed as the inalienable heritage of all human beings and as the 
specific heritage of specific nations, the same nation was at once declared to be subject to laws, which 
would supposedly flow from the Rights of Man, and sovereign, that is, bound by no universal law and 
acknowledging nothing superior to itself [and] from then on human rights were protected and enforced 
only as national rights […] 
 
- Hanna Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism114 
 
In this famous passage on the 1789 French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, 
Hanna Arendt draws our attention not only to the power vacuum that exists beyond the sovereign, 
but also to the stark difference between ‘human rights’ and ‘citizens’ rights’. While citizens’ rights 
are concrete and enforceable by an identifiable political and judicial authority, human rights are, to 
some extent, aspirational and intangible.115  
 
                                                 
110 Ibid. at paragraph 68. 
111 See above n. 97, due to be heard in the Supreme Court in June 2013. 
112 E.g. Smith v Scott 2007 SC 345; 2007 SLT 137; 2007 SCLR 268. 
113  See the discussion in BBC News, ‘Votes for Prisoners – opening the door’, 19 November 2012, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-20397871.  
114 H Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, Andre Deutsch, 1986, p291. 
115 A distinction is often made between absolute and relative human rights, where absolute rights are rights that everyone 
has against everyone else and relative human rights are rights that every member of every legal community has in her 
respective legal community, see e.g. R Alexy, Discourse Theory and Human Rights, (1996) 9 Ratio Juris, 209 and 210. 
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Nowhere is this contrast, between human rights and citizens’ rights, more apparent than in the 
context of the ‘right’ to universal suffrage as formulated in international human rights law. The ideal 
of universal human suffrage, as articulated in many international treaties, has historically been 
subject to the (virtually unquestioned) caveat that this principle does not extend to non-citizens. It 
has, in international practice, been perfectly legitimate for States to exclude non-citizens from the 
scope of their franchise without any suggestion arising that the principle of universal suffrage was 
being encroached upon.116 Although the position has moved on somewhat, the lacuna identified by 
Arendt is still very relevant today in the context of universal suffrage rights. 
 
The rights accorded under the EU Treaties to citizens of the Union to vote and stand in European 
parliamentary elections are entirely sui generis in that, on the one hand, they allocate political 
membership on the basis of Member State nationality (i.e. recognising political rights as citizens’ 
rights rather than human rights in line with the historical status quo) and on the other hand, they are 
accorded to all ‘citizens’ of the supranational union (regardless of nationality) such that they also, in 
some way, transcend nationality. These rights have evolved out of the unprecedented experiment that 
is the European integration project and they are very much the creature of that project. From this 
perspective, Article 39 CFR is merely the latest stage in this evolutionary trajectory and is every bit 
as unique and unprecedented as what it follows.  
 
Indeed, Article 39 CFR is a curious combination of a classic universal suffrage right, of the variety 
found in many international human rights treaties, (i.e. Article 39(2)) and a distinctly ‘Union-esque’ 
EU citizenship right guaranteeing special protections for mobile EU citizens (i.e. Article 39(1)).  
 
Even more curious, perhaps, is the order in which the two limbs of the provision have been 
articulated. One would expect the more general principle of universal suffrage to have been set out 
first and the more specific non-discrimination right to have been set out second. It could perhaps be 
postulated that the drafters of Article 39 adopted this rather peculiar arrangement so as to prevent the 
broader universal suffrage right (of somewhat unknown legal application in the EU context) from 
‘infecting’ the rather more specific and historically contingent EU Citizenship right.  
 
It seems likely that the most obvious place to look, if trying to assess the potential future substance 
of the universal suffrage right at Article 39(2), is to the jurisprudence of the ECrtHR (especially if we 
note the wording of Article 52(3) CFR as discussed above). Perhaps the development of Article 39(2) 
will shadow the cautious jurisprudence of that Court, which has struck a delicate balance between 
recognising the historical right of the sovereign to demarcate the demos on the one hand, and 
extending the ostensibly universal right to human suffrage to ever more groups of individuals on the 
other.  
 
The question that pervades ECHR jurisprudence, as noted above, is: how wide a ‘margin of 
appreciation’ do States have when determining the electorate? Recent cases such as Hirst v United 
Kingdom (No 2)117 and Scoppola v Italy (No 3)118 have confirmed that it is within the competence of 
States to disenfranchise prisoners so long as there is no general and automatic disenfranchisement of 
all serving prisoners. The ECrtHR has also established that stipulating a residence or length-of-
residence requirement for citizens wishing to vote is within the competence of States119 and, in 
Sitaropoulos v Greece (No 1),120 that Article 3, Protocol 1, does not obligate States to enfranchise 
                                                 
116 New Zealand, where non-nationals have been entitled to vote since 1975, is perhaps the most complete exception to 
this. 
117 Above at n. 94. 
118 Above at n. 95. 
119 Above at n.98 
120 Sitaropoulos and Others v Greece (No 1), N° 42202/07, (2010) (confirmed in Sitaropoulos and Others v Greece (No 
2), N° 42202/07, (2012)).  
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their expatriate citizens. Moreover, in Hirst v United Kingdom (No 2), the ECrtHR also confirmed 
that the setting of a minimum age threshold equally does not fall foul of Article 3.121  
 
The Court has, however, constrained the margin somewhat, noting for example, as noted above, in 
Alajo Kiss v Hungary122 and in Hirst (No 2) that the margin of appreciation should also be narrower 
where legislation disenfranchised a particularly vulnerable group in society.123 In the 2012 case of 
Sitaropoulos v Greece (No 2), the Court repeated its oft-recited caution that: 
 
it is for the [ECrtHR] to determine in the last resort whether the requirements of Article 3 of Protocol 
No. 1 have been complied with; it has to satisfy itself that the conditions to which the right to vote and 
the right to stand for election are made subject do not curtail the rights in question to such an extent as 
to impair their very essence and deprive them of their effectiveness; that they meet the requirements 
of lawfulness; that they are imposed in pursuit of a legitimate aim; and that the means employed are 
not disproportionate.124 
 
The ECrtHR has had fewer occasions to deal with an alleged violation of an individual's right to 
stand as a candidate for election under Article 3. In Ždanoka v Latvia, the court noted that the 
‘margin of appreciation’ was historically narrower with respect to the right to vote than the right to 
stand as a candidate and involved different considerations: 
 
As regards the right to stand as a candidate for election, i.e. the so-called “passive” aspect of the rights 
guaranteed by Art.3 of Protocol No.1, the Court has been even more cautious in its assessment of 
restrictions in that context than when it has been called upon to examine restrictions on the right to 
vote, i.e. the so-called “active” element of the rights under Art.3 of Protocol No.1. In the 
Melnychenko judgment […] the Court observed that stricter requirements may be imposed on 
eligibility to stand for election to Parliament than is the case for eligibility to vote. In fact, while the 
test relating to the “active” aspect of Art.3 of Protocol No.1 has usually included a wider assessment 
of the proportionality of the statutory provisions disqualifying a person or a certain group of persons 
from the right to vote, the Court's test in relation to the “passive” aspect of the above provision has 
been limited largely to a check on the absence of arbitrariness in the domestic procedures leading to 
disqualification of an individual from standing as a candidate.125  
 
This position was echoed in the more recent case of Sitaropoulos (No 1). 126  Meanwhile, in 
Melnychenko v Ukraine, the Court also recognised that legislation establishing domestic residence 
requirements for a parliamentary candidate was, in principle, compatible with Article 3. 127 
Furthermore, in Glimmerveen and Hagenbeek v Netherlands, the EComHR declared inadmissible 
two applications concerning the refusal to allow the applicants, who were the leaders of a banned 
organisation with racist and xenophobic tendencies, to stand for election.128 
 
Although the Court has been more forthright in cases like Alajo Kiss and Hirst (No 2), on the whole, 
the basic premise that States are to have a considerable amount of discretion with respect to 
determining the scope of the franchise (and electoral procedure more generally) remains relatively 
unchanged.  
 
Taking the jurisprudence emanating from the ECrtHR together with the CJEU case law analysed 
earlier in this Chapter, the current status quo can be summed up in the following way: while States 
are to have considerable discretion to determine the contours of their political communities, such 
                                                 
121 Above at n. 94. 
122 Above at n. 101. 
123 Ibid. at paragraph 41. 
124 See Sitaropoulos and Others v Greece (No 2), at paragraph 64. Above at n. 120.  
125 Ždanoka v Latvia, N° 58278/00, (2006) at paragraph 115 
126 See Sitaropoulos and Others v Greece (No 1) at paragraphs 41 to 45. Above at n. 120. 
127 Melnychenko v Ukraine, N° 17707/02, (2006), at paragraphs 53 to 67. 
128 Glimmerveen and Hagenbeek v the Netherlands, N°s 8348/78 and 8406/78, (1979). 
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discretion is not, as it once was, absolute: it is subject to international and regional oversight and 
regulation and it is fettered by considerations of reasonableness, equality, proportionality and the 
legitimacy of the ostensible aims being pursued. 
 
The key question, with respect to Article 39 CFR, and especially Article 39(2), is whether these 
provisions will, through their future interpretation by the CJEU, have any transformative effect on 
the ‘margin of appreciation’ currently accorded to EU Member States to determine the electorate. 
Will these provisions, over time, further erode the State sovereignty to determine the electorate?  
 
In McGeoch v Lord President of the Council Court of Session,129 an attempt was made by lawyers 
for the claimant to extend the municipal franchise to prisoners in Scotland by arguing that the 
convicted prisoner disenfranchisement provisions under UK law were incompatible with rights 
granted under Article 20(2)(b) TFEU and Article 40 CFR. However, the Scottish courts held that the 
EU law did not confer upon the nationals of a Member State the right to vote in municipal elections 
in that state (i.e. only mobile EU citizens were covered by the provisions). The court was very 
careful to distinguish the right to vote in municipal elections from the right to vote in European 
parliamentary elections, noting that while the franchise for municipal elections did not fall within the 
scope of EU law, the franchise for European elections did, under Article 14 TFEU (upon which 
Article 39(2) CFR is based). This begged the question of what would happen if European parliament 
elections were brought into play, and this is precisely what has happened in relation to the conjoined 
appeals to the UK Supreme Court in McGeoch and the English case of Chester.130 It is possible that 
the next stage in this saga might then be a reference to the CJEU by the UK Supreme Court giving 
the CJEU the opportunity to articulate its understanding of both the character of the universal 
suffrage right (in relation to EP elections) found in Article 39(2) CFR and also the scope of the 
Member States’ margin of appreciation in that context. If the EU really does ‘own’ the franchise to 
European Parliament elections, as would seem to follow from an argument based on understanding 
the EU as an emergent constitutional polity, it is arguable that, although at the present time it remains 
within the competence of Member States to extend the franchise to certain non EU citizens (as Spain 
v UK shows), Member States are not permitted to exclude certain groups of EU citizens from the 
franchise altogether as Eman and Sevinger hints at (especially if this is not done proportionately or 
rationally). This is an interesting question given the number of EU Member States that still 
disenfranchise both prisoners and persons with mental impairments. Moreover, if EU Member States 
are indeed prohibited from excluding certain groups of EU citizens from the European Parliament 
franchise altogether, is that now on the basis of EU law general principles, CJEU case law, or ECHR 
case law? All of which, as already noted, are likely relevant for the interpretation of Article 39 CFR 
by virtue of Article 52 CFR. These may be the most important questions to come before the courts of 
both the Member States and of the EU in the coming years on the question of the scope of the right 
of universal suffrage. 
 
 
 
                                                 
129 See above n. 97. 
130 See above n. 97. 
